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Abstract
The “dormant” Commerce Clause’s prohibition on extraterritorial regulation has tested
state efforts to battle greenhouse gas-induced climate change through clean energy policies. This
is partly a result of the structure of the North American power grid. Simply put, the electricity
generated by an in-state power facility may be consumed by any other state connected to that
same interconnection. This cross-border flow, sale, and consumption of electricity placed the
grid within the regulatory grasp of the United States Constitution’s Commerce Clause. Congress
therefore has authority to regulate the interstate electricity market. The Supreme Court has also
interpreted an implicit but “dormant” limitation in the Commerce Clause, prohibiting state
legislation that regulates interstate commerce. As a result, the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) has been granted authority by Congress over the transmission and
wholesale sales of electricity in interstate commerce, leaving the regulation of local electricity
generators and utility rates (retail) to the states.
Another reality states face is the uniform mixing of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.
Because of this, state regulations promoting renewable energy and targeting emissions
reductions run the risk of being ineffective if they do not take into account the true measure of
the emissions causing local harm. In other words, states’ climate change prevention policies
chance falling short of reducing actual in-state emissions if they do not take into account out-ofstate emitters that contribute to emissions felt in-state. Thus, the structure of the grid and the
properties of greenhouse gases have left states’ efforts to battle climate change through clean
energy regulation that promotes greenhouse gas reductions particularly vulnerable to challenges
under the dormant Commerce Clause’s prohibition against extraterritorial regulation.
This paper analyzes the judicial application of the dormant Commerce Clause’s
prohibition on extraterritorial regulation to challenges to states’ clean energy legislation. The
3

Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have each taken up the issue of whether such regulations have
an improper extraterritorial reach, but their analyses and holdings on the issue appear to have
muddied the waters with inconsistent interpretations of an already convoluted principle.
However, climate change prevention policies target a broad range of industries, and the fact
patterns before each of the circuits varied not only in the energy sector being regulated, but in
scope. Thus, the question is whether the inconsistent holdings among the circuits were due solely
to the differences in the particular facts of the case before it, solely as a result of differences in
doctrinal interpretation, or some combination of the two.
The answer to that question could have important implications for states moving forward
with aggressive policies seeking to reduce emissions. The paucity of federal involvement has
prompted state governments to take the lead in enacting progressive legislation to mitigate the
local harms of climate change. However, as it stands, states are left uncertain of whether their
legitimate climate change goals and resulting legislation are vulnerable to dormant Commerce
Clause challenges.
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I. Introduction
A. Background on the Dormant Commerce Clause and the Extraterritoriality Principle
Article I of the U.S. Constitution grants the authority “[t]o regulate Commerce . . . among
the several States” to Congress.1 The Commerce Clause has also been interpreted by courts to
“have a ‘negative’ aspect that denies the States power to unjustifiably discriminate against or
burden the interstate flow of articles of commerce.”2 The rationale behind the dormant
Commerce Clause is that the U.S. Constitution was meant to “prohibit state or municipal laws
whose object is local economic protectionism, laws that would excite those jealousies and
retaliatory measures . . . .”3 In practice, the Commerce Clause limits state interference with
interstate commerce.
A state statute runs afoul of the dormant Commerce Clause when (1) it discriminates
against interstate commerce for the benefit of in-state commerce, (2) regulates commerce wholly
outside of the state, or (3) if it excessively burdens interstate commerce relative to the local
benefits produced.4 Statutes that discriminate against interstate commerce or regulate commerce
entirely outside state borders are subject to strict scrutiny, almost guaranteeing the law will be
invalidated.5 To survive strict scrutiny a state must show the regulation protects a legitimate state
interest, and achieving that interest could not be accomplished by “available nondiscriminatory
means.”6 On the other hand, a state regulation that burdens, but does not discriminate against,

1

U.S. Const. art. I § 8, cl. 3.
Rocky Mt. Farmers Union, 730 F.3d 1070, 1087 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2884 (2014) (quoting Or.
Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of State of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 98 (1994)).
3
Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. v. Epel, 43 F. Supp. 3d 1171, 1176 (D. Col. 2014) (quoting C & A Carbone, Inc. v.
Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994).
4
DANIEL A. FARBER & CINNAMON CARLARNE, CLIMATE CHANGE LAW 190 (Foundation Press 1st ed. 2018)
(quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
5
See Daniel K. Lee & Timothy P. Duane, Putting the Dormant Commerce Clause Back to Sleep: Adapting the
Doctrine to Support State Renewable Portfolio Standards, 43 Envtl. L.R. 295, 301 (2013).
6
Rocky Mt. Farmers Union, 730 F.3d at 1087 (quoting Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986)); Energy & Env’t
Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169, 1176 (10th Cir. 2016) (explaining that such discriminatory or extraterritorial
2

5

interstate commerce is subject to the balancing test of Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., and such a
regulation shall be invalidated only “if it imposes a burden on interstate commerce which is not
commensurate with the local benefits secured.”7
The dormant Commerce Clause’s prohibition on state regulations that “ha[ve] the
‘practical effect’ of regulat[ing] commerce occurring wholly outside that State’s borders” is the
extraterritoriality principle.8 The Healy Court held that the dormant Commerce Clause’s
prohibition on extraterritorial regulation proscribed “the application of a state statute to
commerce that takes place wholly outside of the State’s borders, whether or not the commerce
has effects within the State.”9 Moreover, a statute directly controlling “wholly” out-of-state
commerce is invalid, regardless of the legislative intent.10 Courts evaluate the “practical effect”
of the statute by considering its direct consequences, its “interact[ion] with the legitimate
regulatory regimes of other States,” and the possible effects if many (or all) states “adopted
similar legislation.”11
B. Applying the Extraterritoriality Principle to State Climate Change Legislation
The extraterritoriality principle has not been applied uniformly across the courts. The
Supreme Court has not provided a clear test to determine whether a state statute has the
“practical effect” of controlling commerce outside state jurisdiction, and has only applied the
principle in a limited number of cases.12 In the context of certain state climate change prevention

statutes must be “demonstrably justified by a valid factor unrelated to economic protectionism,” or they will be
struck down).
7
397 U.S. 137 (1970).; Energy & Env’t Legal Inst., 793 F.3d at 1171.
8
Healy v. Beer Institute, Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 331 (1989); see North Dakota v. Heydinger, 825 F.3d 912, 919 (8th Cir.
2016) (regardless of the effect on in-state commerce, a statute that “control[s] conduct beyond the boundaries of the
State” is likely invalid per se).
9
Healy, 491 U.S. at 336 (quoting Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642-43 (1982)(plurality opinion)).
10
Id.
11
Id. at 336, 337 (“the Commerce Clause protects against inconsistent legislation arising from the projection of one
state regulatory regime into the jurisdiction of another State”).
12
Heydinger, 825 F.3d at 919; Farber & Carlarne, supra note 9, at 195.
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policies, extraterritoriality is potentially ill-suited to address climate change legislation that
legitimately takes into account out-of-state greenhouse gases (GHGs) emitted by out-of-state
generators. This is partially due to the interconnectedness of a regional electricity grid across
multiple states, whereby state regulation of local electricity markets may impact out-of-state
generators connected to that region’s electricity grid.13 Furthermore, because GHGs mix
uniformly in the atmosphere, state emissions reduction programs may inadvertently amplify
emissions through “leakage,”14 working against the goal of reducing overall GHGs associated
with meeting the State’s consumption.15
Although the federal government has attempted to promote renewable energy and
carbon-reduction initiatives, it has so far failed to enact comprehensive legislation that would
direct states to develop renewable energy initiatives.16 As the localized effects of GHG-driven
climate change are felt more acutely, and as federal inaction continues, state governments have
taken up the task of developing energy policies that reduce GHG emissions in their territory.17
An example of one mechanism employed by states is the Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPSs),

13

The line between federal and state electricity market control is murky due to the interconnectedness of the grid
and overlapping areas of wholesale and retail electricity; and federal and state attempts at regulating the wholesale
and retail markets, respectively, have been subject to litigation. See e.g., Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136
S. Ct 1288 (2016) (holding that Maryland’s power program, setting the rate a power company received for interstate
wholesale electricity capacity, intruded on FERC’s authority to regulate wholesale sales of electricity); see also
FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016) (holding a FERC rule aimed at reducing energy prices
and pressure on the grid, although influencing the retail electricity market, did not intruded on State authority to
regulate the retail market). See also, Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth Henley, Energy Policy, Extraterritoriality, and
the Dormant Commerce Claus, 5 San Diego J. Climate & Energy L. 127, 129 (2014).
14
Carbon “leakage” refers to a situation where the costs related to a jurisdiction’s climate policies shift industry out
of that jurisdiction to one with less stringent controls, and thus amplifying emissions elsewhere. Farber & Carlarne,
supra note 9, at 13. Another carbon leakage mechanism is the “rebound effect,” which generally refers to the
scenario where energy efficiency measures, and any related decrease in energy costs associated with those measures,
cause consumers to increase their energy use, potentially negating the benefit gained through efficiency measures.
Id.
15
See Rocky Mt. Farmers Union, 730 F.3d at 1080 (“[b]ecause GHGs mix in the atmosphere, all emissions related
to transportation fuels used in California pose the same local risk to California citizens”).
16
See Lee & Duane, supra note 10, at 297; Klass & Henley, supra note 5, at 154.
17
See e.g., Klass & Henley, supra note 5, at 155 (discussing state “energy policy legislation governing fuels,
renewable electricity, and programs to more significantly promote new energy technologies”).
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which generally require electricity suppliers to provide consumers with a certain percentage of
electricity generated from renewable sources.18 A few states have also developed policies—e.g.,
Zero-emissions Credit (ZEC) programs—that compensate nuclear power plants for the carbonfree electricity they produce.19 Additionally, states have developed regulations targeting
emissions from transportation fuels, and from new coal-fired power plants.20 As a result, the state
climate change prevention policies that have implicated extraterritorial regulation cover a diverse
range of energy sectors, complicating the courts’ application of extraterritoriality in those cases.
1. Overview of State Climate Change Initiatives Challenged Under
Extraterritoriality
Part II discusses the Ninth Circuit’s upholding of California’s Low Carbon Fuels
Standard (LCFS) after it was challenged by Midwest ethanol producers as violating the
extraterritoriality principle by penalizing outside emitters for the benefit of California ethanol
producers.21 The court formed its opinion from the central rationale that “California is entitled to
proceed on the understanding that global warming is being induced by rising carbon emissions
and [California can] attempt to change that trend.”22 Thus, California may regulate to address
local harms from carbon emissions, and incentivize out-of-state conduct to help meet in-state
clean energy goals by taking into account any relevant harmful property of that out-of-state
product.23 Those “incidental effects on interstate commerce” are not per se invalid.24 The court

18

Farber & Carlarne, supra note 9, at 117.
NUCLEAR ENERGY INST., ZERO-EMISSION CREDITS 3 (2018), https://www.nei.org/CorporateSite/media/filefolder
/resources/reports-and-briefs/zero-emission-credits-201804.pdf.
20
See Rocky Mt. Farmers Union, 730 F.3d at 1070; Heydinger, 825 F.3d at 912.
21
Rocky Mt. Farmers Union, 730 F.3d at 1080, 1101.
22
Id. at 1090.
23
Id. at 1104 (explaining that some relevant physical properties of ethanol include those related to location.).
24
Id. at 1106.
19
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was patently protecting California’s “role as a leader in developing air-quality standards” and the
serious threat to California’s public health and environment due to climate change.25
Part III discusses the case that followed a couple years later in the Tenth Circuit
involving a Colorado Renewable Energy Standard (RES) Statute’s provisions (referred to as the
“Renewables Quota”), requiring utility companies to provide Colorado electricity consumers
with a certain percentage of electricity from renewable sources. The court limited
extraterritoriality challenges to price-control regulations, “linking in-state prices to those charged
elsewhere,” resulting in “raising costs for out-of-state consumers or rival businesses.” 26 Using
this rationale, it was easy for the court to distinguish the Renewables Quota because it simply
regulated the “quality of a good sold to in-state residents.”27 The effect of the ruling is that
climate change prevention policies subject to Tenth Circuit jurisdiction will violate the
extraterritoriality principle only if it is a transparent price control or affirmation not quality
control law. 28
Part IV discusses a case decided a year later in the Eighth Circuit on a Commerce Clause
and preemption challenge to Minnesota’s Next Generation Energy Act (NGEA) provisions
prohibiting regulated parties from meeting in-state electrical demand with imports of electricity
produced by new fossil fuel generation, and new long-term power purchase agreements that
would contribute to statewide power sector carbon dioxide emissions.29 The statute provided an
exception for natural gas electricity producers, and limited the size of the facilities covered; thus,
the statute had the practical effect of regulating mostly new coal-powered generators.30 Judge

25

Id. at 1079.
Energy & Envt’l Legal Inst., 793 F.3d at 1172.
27
Id. at 1173. (emphasis added).
28
Id. at 1175 (the court cited the “serious problems of overinclusion” that might cause well-grounded health and
safety regulations be invalidated just because they have the effect of controlling conduct outside the state).
29
North Dakota v. Heydinger, 15 F. Supp. 3d 891, 897-98 (D. Minn. 2014).
30
Minn. Stat. § 216H.03, subd. 3; see Klass & Henley, supra note 5, at 170.
26
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Loken, writing the opinion, found the provisions were an impermissible extraterritorial reach of
Minnesota’s authority because the “broad prohibitions” of the statute “plainly encompass[ed]
non-Minnesota entities and transactions,” forcing out-of-staters to comply with Minnesota’s law
even when transacting business entirely outside of Minnesota.31 The other two panel members
agreed the statute was unconstitutional, but relied on preemption, not Commerce Clause,
grounds.32
2. Do the Circuit Court Rulings Create Confusion on Extraterritoriality?
Part V analyzes the resulting discrepancies created by the courts’ application of
extraterritoriality to state climate change prevention policies. Each of the three statutes at issue in
the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuit regulated either a discrete energy sector, or was distinct in
its scope. California’s LCFS regulated transportation fuels blended and sold in California.
Colorado’s RES regulated utility companies purchasing electricity for Colorado electricity
consumers. Minnesota’s NGEA prohibited the importation of certain new fossil fuel-powered
electricity, and prohibited certain power-purchase agreements that would contribute to statewide
emissions. The shared attribute of the three statutes was their purpose—i.e., all were state climate
change initiatives promoting renewable energy and targeting the reduction of related GHGs. Yet,
California’s LCFS, and Colorado’s RES were upheld as constitutional, while Minnesota’s
NGEA prohibitions were struck down. Thus, the question is whether the different outcomes in
each of the circuits was due to a difference of circumstance, or a difference of doctrinal
interpretation. This paper attempts to: (1) draw out the specific facts that each court relied upon
in determining whether or not the statute was an impermissible extraterritorial reach of the

31
32

Heydinger, 825 F.3d at 921.
Id. at 923-29.
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State’s authority, and (2) look at the differences in each court’s interpretation and ultimate
application of extraterritoriality to the statute at issue before it.
II. Rocky Mt. Farmers Union v. Corey.
A. California’s Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS)
California’s Air Resource Board (CARB) promulgated regulations pursuant to
California’s Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (also referred to as “AB 32”), which
recognized the palpable threat global warming posed to the State’s economy, environment, and
public health.33 The CARB regulation at issue in Rocky Mt. Farmers Union was the Low Carbon
Fuel Standard (LCFS), addressing GHGs emitted in the production and transportation of
transportation fuels (“embedded” GHGs).34 CARB used a lifecycle analysis to determine the
embedded GHGs of ethanol destined to be blended, sold, and consumed in California.35 The
lifecycle analysis took into account emissions associated with all aspects of ethanol production
including crop growth (typically corn or sugar), the electricity type and efficiency used during
processing (e.g., coal, hydroelectricity, or natural gas), and all transportation.36 California also
imports certain feedstock for local ethanol refining and blending.37 Regulated entities could
comply with the LCFS either by relying on a “default pathway”—a known pathway with a
predesignated carbon intensity—or by registering an individualized pathway, which would
calculate the pathway’s carbon intensity using listed formulas.38

33

Rocky Mt. Farmers Union, 730 F.3d at 1079.
Rocky Mt. Farmers Union v. Goldstene (Rocky Mountain II), 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1079-81 (E.D. Cal. 2011),
rev’d sub nom. Rocky Mt. Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2884
(2014) (specifically at issue were the ethanol and crude oil (and its derivatives) provisions).
35
Rocky Mt. Farmers Union, 730 F.3d at 1080-81 (lifecycle values were assigned using a carbon intensity value).
36
Id. at Appx. 2; see Id. at 1081-82 (the lifecycle analysis is built upon the Greenhouse Gases, Regulated Emissions,
and Energy Use in Transportation Model (GREET)). The result is that ethanol produced and shipped from the
Midwest to a California blender will have a carbon intensity value associated with the entirety of the process.
37
Id. at 1082.
38
Id.
34
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The LCFS also created a cap and trade system, with a declining annual carbon intensity
cap on transportation fuels sold and consumed in California.39 This market-based system was
intended to “stimulate and [sic] the production and use of alternative, low-carbon fuels in
California,” with the advantage that it would decrease California’s dependence on petroleum.40
Both the ethanol and crude oil provisions were challenged by a collective of industry
groups, arguing that the LCFS impermissibly discriminated against out-of-state corn ethanol,
regulated extraterritorially, and excessively burdened interstate commerce without producing any
local benefit.41 Only the ethanol provisions were challenged as regulating extraterritorially.
B. District Court Holds the LCFS is an Impermissible Extraterritorial Reach
The district court found that California’s LCFS had an impermissible extraterritorial
reach because the method of assigning carbon intensity values based upon different geographic
areas—or factors which depended upon location—penalized regulated parties for outside
conduct, having the “practical effect” of controlling conduct beyond the borders of California.42
After finding the lifecycle analysis approach to GHGs amounted to an impermissible
extraterritorial reach, the court applied strict scrutiny and struck down the statute.43
1. The Consequences of the LCFS on Out-of-State Ethanol Producers
CARB admitted that the purpose of assigning carbon intensity values to ethanol pathways
using the lifecycle analysis was to give an “incentive for regulated parties to adopt production
methods which result in lower emissions.”44 Meaning, both in-state and out-of-state pathways

39

Id. at 1080 (regulated parties selling ethanol in California generated credits or deficits depending on whether its
carbon intensity was less than or above the cap).
40
Rocky Mountain II, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1079.
41
Id. at 1079. (the LCFS was also challenged on the grounds that it is preempted by the EISA).
42
Id. at 1091-92 (regulating “wholly” out-of-state conduct refers to regulating conduct between out-of-state
producers in transactions to which California was not a party).
43
Id. at 1093-1094.
44
Id. at 1091.
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with high carbon intensity practices (e.g., long transportation routes, high-emissions power
sources such as coal, and inefficient land use) were more likely to fall above the LCFS market
cap, incurring deficits that must be made up for with credits.45
The court held that California could not take “legal and political responsibility” for
commerce occurring wholly outside its borders, regardless of whether those products were
consumed in California.46 The LCFS “impermissibly regulate[d] the channels of interstate
commerce” because the method of generating credits, requiring a regulated party to get approval
by the CARB, forced parties to “seek regulatory approval in [California] before undertaking a
transaction in another.”47
2. The LCFS Risks the Economic Balkanization of the Electricity Market
The court considered the interaction of the LCFS with the regulatory regimes of other
states, and the possible effects of the adoption of similar legislation by many other states.48 The
court held that the LCFS was an impermissible reach of California’s regulatory authority because
the possible inconsistent legislation from state to state arising from a wide-spread adoption of
similar LCFS regulations would cause significant hardships to producers attempting to satisfy
multiple different GHG reduction levels in many different markets.49 Also, different regulatory
regimes risked fragmenting the national ethanol market into competing state-run markets.50
After finding the LCFS in violation of the Commerce Clause’s prohibition on
extraterritorial regulation (as well as finding facial discrimination), the statute could not survive

45

Id. at 1091 (the court determined that this amounted to penalizing out-of-state ethanol production practices).
Id. at 1902.
47
Id. at 1079, 1902.
48
Id. at 1090.
49
Id. at 1093.
50
Id. at 1092 (explaining the Commerce Clause is meant to prevent this sort of economic balkanization).
46
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strict scrutiny because California had failed to prove that its legitimate purpose of reducing GHG
emissions could not be served through alternative, nondiscriminatory means.51
In its discrimination analysis, the court focused on the LCFS lifecycle analysis’
differentiation of ethanol pathways, assigning carbon intensity values based on geographical
regions, transportation distances, and factors tied to location.52 Regardless of origin-related
lifecycle factors that benefit out-of-state ethanol producers, the price difference of chemicallyidentical ethanol in the California market would be based upon origin—and that amounted to
discrimination. Piggy-backing on this, the court turned to the issue of extraterritorially.53 The
court held that the lifecycle analysis, as described, “attempt[ed] to account for-and reduceemissions from the entire pathway,” amounted to “penalizing” the practices of other states.54
C. Ninth Circuit Overturns District Court Application of the Extraterritoriality Principle
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis with the standard, recognized in Massachusetts v.
EPA, that climate change poses a legitimate local threat to states.55 The court determined that
because California’s legislature determined California was at “tremendous risk” from climate
change, and GHG emissions from transportation fuels were contributing to that risk, not only
was it permissible for California to regulate to reduce that risk using a “market-based solution,”
it was appropriate that the lifecycle analysis take into account the “real extent of GHG

Id. at 1093 (the court agreed that California’s LCFS served a “legitimate and local” interest).
Id. at 1086-88. Regardless of origin, ethanol sold in California has the same physical and chemical properties;
thus, the carbon intensity values for producers with the same feedstock and processing can only be distinguished by
origin-specific factors. Id. Despite the fact that the lifecycle analysis is a scientific formula uniformly applied to all
ethanol pathways, the court confusingly separated the lifecycle factors into those based on origin, and those not (like
feedstock and production process), and then determined the only relevant comparison was pathways with identical
feedstock and production processes, and to ask why those two pathways produce identical ethanol with different
carbon intensities (and price) by the time they enter the California ethanol market—of course, the only comparison
left is origin-based differences. Id. Under this reasoning, Brazilian ethanol—with a lower carbon intensity than some
California pathways—was entirely removed from the court’s analysis since it is made from sugarcane, vice corn. Id.
53
Id. at 1091 (“[o]stensibly, the LCFS regulates only fuel-providers in California”).
54
Id. (explaining that this “penalizing” had the practical effect of controlling wholly out-of-state conduct).
55
Rocky Mt. Farmers Union, 730 F.3d at 1080; See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 522 (2007).
51
52
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emissions.”56 The court stressed that the principles of federalism should protect states serving as
“laborator[ies] for innovation.”57 Any incidental effects on interstate commerce arising from that
constitutional exercise should be analyzed under Pike, a standard of scrutiny a state statute is
more likely to survive.58
1. Discrimination Based on Origin, with a Sense of Extraterritorial Reach
Discrimination under the dormant Commerce Clause “simply means differential
treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the
latter.”59 This analysis assumes the “comparison of substantially similar entities.”60
The court emphasized the importance of examining ethanol pathways for discrimination
using the carbon intensity values which take into account all lifecycle factors.61 Meaning, that if
California “assign[ed] different carbon intensities to ethanol from different regions, there must
be some reason, apart from their origin, to treat them differently.”62 California assigned higher
carbon intensities to certain pathways, but the “treatment [was not based] on a fuel’s origin but
on its carbon intensity,” considering location “only to the extent” it affected lifecycle factors.63 In
other words, California did not discriminate against out-of-state ethanol producers by assigning
pathways different carbon intensity values for the purpose of conducting the lifecycle analysis.

Id. at 1106 (explaining that the “real extent” necessarily included emissions by out-of-state producers).
Id. at 1079.
58
Id. at 1106.
59
Id. at 1087 (quoting Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of State of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994)).
60
Id. (explaining that entities are substantially similar for constitutional purposes “if their products compete against
each other in a single market.”) (quoting Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 298-99 (1997)).
61
Id. at 1088 (explaining that a full understanding of the carbon intensity value of each pathway is crucial to
determining whether the LCFS discriminates against out-of-state ethanol pathways).
62
Id. at 1089 (quoting Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978)) (internal quotations omitted)
(explaining that assigning different carbon intensity values to ethanol pathways from different regions does not
automatically equate to discrimination.).
63
Id. at 1089-90.
56
57
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The court found that the lower court erred when it held that lifecycle factors correlated
with origin, like transportation and electricity type, were “impermissible under the dormant
Commerce Clause.”64 The district court also erred in concluding that Brazilian ethanol pathways
were unsuitable for comparison with other Midwest and California ethanol pathways.65 The court
reasoned that all ethanol pathways to California result in chemically-identical ethanol being
“blended” in California; thus, in close competition with each other in a single ethanol market.66
2. The LCFS is not an Impermissible Extraterritorial Reach and Incidental Effects
on Interstate Commerce Should be Examined under Pike Balancing
The court rejected the district court’s application of the extraterritoriality principle and
disagreed that the LCFS was an attempt by California to “regulate[] the channels of interstate
commerce,” or to control wholly out-of-state conduct.67 The court held that the LCFS was not an
impermissible extraterritorial reach because it had only incidental effects on interstate commerce,
and sought only to influence, not control, out-of-state behavior.68 The Court reasoned that the
LCFS does not require any out-of-state producer to adopt any regulation before selling ethanol in
California.69 Additionally, the market-based system of credits and caps set up by the LCFS
applied “only to the portfolios of [California] fuel blenders” and “the producers who contract

64

Id. at 1090.
Id.
66
Id. at 1089-90 (explaining that by excluding origin-specific lifecycle factors from comparison, the district court
essentially labeled those factors “ungrounded presumption[s] that unfairly prejudice out-of-state ethanol,” when, in
reality, each origin-specific factor is “an average based on scientific data”).
67
Id. at 1101.
68
Id. at 1100 (reasoning that the LCFS regulated only the California market, providing incentives to producers
wishing to do business in the California ethanol market—without requiring any certain conduct.).
69
Id. at 1103 (explaining that the LCFS imposes no fines or penalties for any out-of-state behavior, but rather
incentivizes producers to voluntarily adopt low-carbon intensity methods in order to be competitive in the California
ethanol market).
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with them.”70 Essentially, states may address local harms by encouraging certain behavior within
its borders using market incentives without running afoul of the extraterritoriality principle.
The court addressed the balkanizing effects of the LCFS as an “alternative basis” to
extraterritorial regulation.71 As the court points out previously in the opinion, this analysis is
actually part of determining the “practical effect” of a statute under the extraterritoriality
principle.72 Since the balkanization effects of the LCFS are relevant to a discussion of whether it
is impermissible extraterritorial regulation, the court’s reasoning is addressed here. The court
dismissed the district court’s concern that widespread adoption would cause hardships for out-ofstate ethanol producers by forcing them to move to the “State of largest use,” sell only locally, or
by creating inconsistent regulations impossible for individual producers to satisfy.73 If every state
regulated only fuels consumed within its borders, it “would not create the interlocking problems
of cross-border price setting or out-of-state approval” the extraterritorially principle prohibits.74
III. Energy & Envt’l Legal Inst. v. Epel.
A. Colorado’s Renewable Energy Standard (RES) Statute
Colorado’s Renewable Energy Standard (RES) Statute and its implementing regulations
were challenged by a non-profit energy and environmental organization (EELI) and others for
violating the Commerce Clause.75 The RES Statute was the result of a 2004 vote by Colorado

Id. (explaining that an impermissible extraterritorial reach of a state’s authority must be an attempt to control
wholly out-of-state behavior, such as a state’s mandating “compliance with their preferred policies in wholly out-ofstate transactions”).
71
Id. at 1104.
72
Id. at 1101
73
Id. at 1104 (explaining that the widespread adoption of similar LCFS statutes by other states would harmonize
states’ goals of promoting low-carbon intensity fuels.).
74
Id. at 1105 (explaining that the concerns were unfounded because the LCFS did not exclude any fuel from
entering the in-state market, charge out-of-state producers inappropriate fees to enter the in-state market, attempt to
control other states fuel markets, and did not cause other states to “peg [their] fuel prices or regulatory standards to
those of another”).
75
Energy & Env’t Legal Inst., 43 F. Supp. 3d at 1174.
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Citizens “intend[ing] to promote the development and utilization of renewable energy
resources.”76 The provisions at issue were collectively referred to as the “Renewables Quota”
that required, as amended, “each retail utility to generate, or cause to be generated, renewable
energy resources in specified minimum amounts.”77 Regulated utilities could meet their quota by
generating electricity using renewable sources, purchasing electricity generated by renewable
energy, or purchasing renewable energy credits.78 Regulated utilities had to seek approval from
Colorado’s Public Utility Commission (PUC) to use renewable energy and energy credits
towards their quota. Certain utilities were required to submit to the PUC, and receive approval
of, detailed compliance plans.79
The basis of the challenge was that the Renewables Quota would cause out-of-state, coalfired electricity generators to lose business with other out-of-state utilities that provide electricity
to the regional grid.80 This was due to the interconnectedness of the regional grid of which
Colorado is member state, and the fact that Colorado is a net importer of electricity.81
B. District Court Holds the Renewables Quota is not an Impermissible Extraterritorial Reach
The Renewables Quota was challenged under the theory that it restricted the
manufacturing of out-of-state goods and required “out-of-state electricity to be generated
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Id.
Id. (The Renewables Quota required investor-owned utilities to purchase 30% of its retail electricity from
renewables, certain cooperative electric associations to purchase 20% of its electricity from renewables, and other
cooperative electric associations and large municipal utilities to purchase 10% of their retail electricity from
renewables, by 2020.).
78
Id. at 1175 (renewable sources that could be credited to the quota included re-captured energy generated by the
“heat from exhaust stacks or pipes”, solar, wind, geothermal, biomass, and “hydroelectricity with certain
restrictions.”).
79
Id.
80
Energy & Env’t Legal Inst., 793 F.3d at 1170.
81
Id. (explaining that the interconnected grid serves seven states and portions of Canada and Mexico). It is
important that Colorado is a net importer of electricity to understand that Colorado utilities necessarily purchase a
large percentage of electricity from out-of-state.
77
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according to Colorado’s terms.”82 The court disagreed, finding that the Renewables Quota
governed only Colorado utilities in Colorado transactions.83 The court, like the Ninth Circuit’s
decision in Rocky Mt. Farmers Union, addressed federalism concerns, and was unwilling to
invalidate a state statute simply because it differed from other states or incentivized certain outof-state behavior.84 The Renewables Quota survived the Pike balancing test because it likely
burdened in-state and out-of-state entities equally, if at all.85
1. The Renewables Quota Does not have the Practical Effect of Controlling Wholly
Out-of-state Commerce
The district court narrowly construed conduct that amounted to controlling “wholly” outof-state commerce.86 Specifically, when Colorado regulated both in-state electricity generators
and also transactions between out-of-state and in-state entities, it did not regulate “wholly”
extraterritorial commerce.87 The court took a similar stance to the Ninth Circuit, finding
incidental effects on interstate commerce arising from legitimate in-state regulatory schemes
meant to incentivize out-of-state behavior not invalid per se.88
The court’s reasoning is straightforward. The RES did not impact transactions conducted
entirely out of state.89 It regulated Colorado electricity generators and out-of-state generators
entering into transactions with Colorado utilities. Interstate commerce was not affected “unless
and until an out-of-state electricity generator freely [chose] to do business” with Colorado.90 Out-

Energy & Env’t Legal Inst., 43 F. Supp. 3d at 1179. (“Plaintiffs contend that the Renewables Quota is a ‘mandate’
which requires energy produced wholly out-of-state to comply with Colorado-approved methods for renewable
energy”).
83
Id. at 1181.
84
Id. at 1180 (“the fact that the RES may provide an incentive for out-of-state companies to conduct their business
in a manner that complies with Colorado’s renewable energy standards also does not make the statute improper”).
85
Id. 1184.
86
Id. at 1178-79.
87
Id. 1181 (explaining that the “RES does not control any aspect of a transaction between two out-of-state entities”).
88
Id. at 1180 (“the fact that [the Renewable Quota’s] incentive structure may negatively impact the profits of out-ofstate generators whose electricity cannot be used to fulfil the Quota does not make the Renewables Quota invalid.”).
89
Id. at 1179.
90
Id.
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19

of-state generators were not required to change any conduct because of the statute.91 The RES
did not place conditions on electricity imported into Colorado, affecting out-of-state generators
only to the extent Colorado utilities could count the electricity towards its Renewables Quota.92
The RES may negatively impact both in-state and out-of-state non-renewable electrical
generators—but such an impact does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause.93 The RES did
not interfere with other state’s regulatory regimes, nor disrupt any perceived need for uniformity
in the market.94
2. The Renewables Quota Burdens All Generators Equally, or Not at All
Using the Pike balancing test, the court turned to the issue of whether the impact that the
Renewables Quota did have on interstate commerce nevertheless invalidated the statute.95 The
Renewables Quota satisfied the Pike balancing test because the challengers “failed to show that
the RES burdens interstate commerce at all, much less that any such burden is clearly excessive
in relation to the benefits conferred on the state by the RES. . . .”96
The court used four factors to determine whether the Renewables Quota failed the Pike
balancing test: (1) the burden on interstate commerce; (2) the nature of the statute’s local
benefits; (3) whether the burden is “clearly excessive in relation to” local interests; and (4)
whether local interests could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate commerce.97
The Renewables Quota did not make it more difficult for electricity to be produced and
transmitted to and from states interconnected through the grid.98 The fact that the Renewables
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Id.
Id. at 1180.
93
Id.
94
Id. at 1181.
95
Id.
96
Id. at 1183.
97
Id. at 1182 (quoting Blue Circle Cement, Inc. v. Bd. Of Cty. Comm’rs, 27 F.3d 1499, 1512 (10th Cir. 1994)).
98
Id. (explaining that any burden that the Renewables Quota might have on non-renewable electricity producers
would be felt the same by in-state and out-of-state generators.).
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Quota caused Colorado utilities to shift to purchasing renewable energy did not invalidate an
“otherwise valid regulation.”99
The scope of the Pike balancing test is not the focus of this paper. But the factors that the
Tenth Circuit took into account when conducting its analysis under Pike read as a continuum of
the analysis done under the extraterritoriality principle. In other words, the rationales for
upholding the Renewables Quota under extraterritoriality and Pike, overlapped. For example,
applying Pike, the court reasoned that the lack of uniformity in state regulation of the electricity
market did not excessively burden interstate commerce.100 This same reasoning was also used in
the court’s application of the extraterritoriality principle in determining that the Renewables
Quota did not have the “practical effect” of controlling conduct wholly out of state because the
Plaintiffs hadn’t “demonstrate[ed] that there exists such a compelling need for uniformity in the
market for renewable energy credits that having a system of different or even inconsistent state
regulations is unworkable.”101
C. The Tenth Circuit Limits the Extraterritoriality Principle to Price-control Statutes
The only issue before the Tenth Circuit was whether the Renewables Quota, requiring instate utilities to purchase a percentage of electricity meant for in-state sales from renewable
energy generators, violated the dormant Commerce Clause’s prohibition against extraterritorial
regulation.102 The opinion, written by Justice Gorsuch while he served on the Tenth Circuit, took
up the issue of whether the Renewables Quota, requiring in-state utilities to purchase a
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Id. at 1183.
Id. at 1182.
101
Id. at 1181-82.
102
The Plaintiffs did not appeal the lower courts determination that the Renewables Quota did not discriminate
against interstate commerce or excessively burden interstate commerce. Energy & Env’t Legal Inst., 793 F.3d at
1172.
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percentage of the electricity meant for in-state sales from renewable energy generators violated
“the most dormant doctrine in dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence.”103
The court, citing the three Supreme Court cases where a state statute was struct down
using the extraterritorial principle, determined that those cases involved only price-control or
price-affirmation statutes linking in-state and out-of-state prices, and had the effect of “raising
costs for out-of-state consumers or rival businesses.” 104 The court distinguished the RES,
determining it was more akin to a “quality of good[s]” mandate than a price-control statute
because it required utilities to purchase a certain type of product.105 The court accepted that even
quality control regulations might ultimately affect prices in-state and out-of-state. Thus, while
the effect of a statute might be to link in-state and out-of-state prices, or raise prices for out-ofstaters, “without a regulation more blatantly regulating price and discriminating against out-ofstate consumers or producers,” those effects are not sufficient to trigger per se invalidation.”106
In its extraterritoriality analysis, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that the Renewables Quota
did not discriminate against out-of-staters.107 This exemplifies the blurry distinction between a
statute that discriminates, and one that impermissibly regulates extraterritorially—i.e., whether a
law discriminates against out-of-staters is arguably a separate test from extraterritoriality. But,
the issues of whether the Renewables Quota discriminated against interstate commerce, or
excessively burdened interstate commerce under Pike, were not appealed, and so the Tenth
Circuit never reached either issue. However, the court did say that state statutes regulating “nonprice standards for products sold in-state,” such as Colorado’s RES, “may be amenable to
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Id. at 1170.
Id. at 1172-73 (citing Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935), Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v.
New York State Liquor Authority, 476 U.S. 573 (1986), and Healy v. Beer Institute, Inc., 491 U.S. 324 (1989).
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Id. at 1173 (explaining further that the Renewables Quota did not link the price paid for electricity by Colorado
consumer to prices paid for electricity by out-of-state consumers.).
106
Id.
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Id.
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scrutiny under the generally applicable Pike balancing test, or scrutinized for traces of
discrimination . . . .”108
Interestingly, the district court, in its extraterritoriality analysis, cited a non-price control
statute struck down in Edgar v. MITE Corp.109 In that case, an Illinois statute required any
takeover offer for shares of a target company to submit offers to the Secretary of State of Illinois,
including situations where the target company was neither incorporated or headquartered in
Illinois.110 The statute was challenged on preemption and Commerce Clause grounds, and while
the Court did not reach a majority decision on the preemption issue, it struck down the statute on
Commerce Clause grounds.111 Part V-A of the opinion, analyzing the extraterritorial effects of
the Illinois statute, was a plurality opinion.112 In Part V-A, Justice White, joined by Justices
Burger, Stevens, and O’Conner, found the Illinois statute had a “sweeping extraterritorial effect”
because the statute could apply to a tender offer by a foreign corporation that would not
implicate Illinois shareholders at all.113 Thus, it had the effect of directly regulating “wholly”
out-of-state transactions across state lines.114 Additionally, the court held that the effect of states
other than Illinois adopting similar legislation would be to “thoroughly stifle[]” interstate
commerce in securities transactions.115
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Id.
457 U.S. 624 (1982) (plurality opinion);
110
Edgar, 475 U.S. at 627 (defining a target company as “a corporation or other issuer of securities of which
shareholders located in Illinois own 10% of the class of equity securities subject to the offer, or for which any two of
the following three conditions are met: the corporation has its principal executive office in Illinois, is organized
under the laws of Illinois, or has at least 10% of its state capital and paid-in surplus represented within the state”).
111
Edgar, 475 U.S. at 626, 641.
112
Id. The majority opinion, however, did hold that the statute was in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause
under Pike. Id. (Part V-B of the opinion).
113
Id. at 642.
114
Id. at 643.
115
Id. at 642.
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The Tenth Circuit, however, declined to adopt Edgar’s extraterritoriality analysis in its
opinion, instead relying on cases involving instances of “naked price fixing” by state regulations
or “something else experience teaches to be clearly invidious.”116 In other words, unlike the
Ninth or Eighth Circuits, the Tenth Circuit effectively limited the applicability of the
extraterritoriality principle to price-control or price-affirmation statutes.
IV. North Dakota v. Heydinger
A. Minnesota’s Next Generation Energy Act (NGEA)
Passed in 2007, the NGEA established energy standards aimed reducing “statewide
[GHG] emissions across all sectors producing those emissions.”117 Specifically at issue were the
related provisions aimed at limiting increases in “statewide power sector carbon dioxide
emissions.”118 Statewide power sector carbon dioxide emissions included total annual carbon
dioxide emissions from in-state power generators and electricity imported into and consumed in
the state.119 The provisions provided that on or after August 1, 2009, no person shall: (1)
construct in-state new large electricity facilities, (2) import (or commitment to import) electricity
from new large out-of-state generators, or (3) enter into “new long-term power purchase
agreement[s]” that would contribute to statewide carbon dioxide emissions.120 Because of the
exceptions for natural gas-fired generators, and a limit on the capacity of regulated power plants
(facilities with a combined capacity of less than 100 megawatts were excepted), the practical
effect of the law was to limit its applicability to new coal-fired plants in Minnesota built after
2007, and out-of-state coal-fired plants built after 2007 that wanted to import electricity for
Energy & Env’t Legal Inst., 43 F. Supp. 3d at 1174.
Minn. Stat. § 216H.02, subd. 1. The levels sought were “at least 15 percent below 2005 levels by 2015, to a level
at least 30 percent below 2005 levels by 2025, and to a level at least 80 percent below 2005 levels by 2050.” Id.
118
Minn. Stat. § 216H.03, subd. 3; Heydinger, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 897 (quoting Minn. Stat. § 216H.03, subd. 3).
119
Heydinger, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 898.
120
Id. (a “long-term power purchase agreement” is “an agreement to purchase 50 [MW] of capacity or more for a
term exceeding five years”).
116
117
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consumption in Minnesota.121 Violators (and potential violators) were subject to legal action, as
determined by the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission (MPUC) and Minnesota Department
of Commerce (MDOC).122 The NGEA created an offset exemption, allowing regulated parties to
show that contributions to statewide emissions would be offset by a carbon dioxide reduction
project.123
A myriad of out-of-state actors, including the State of North Dakota and the North
Dakota lignite coal industry, and at least one in-state rural electric cooperative challenged the
Minnesota Statute on constitutional and preemption grounds.124
B. District Court Holds the NGEA Overreaches and Risks Balkanizing the Electricity Market
As an initial matter, the court addressed the scope of the statute due to the disagreement
between the parties as to the interpretation of the phrases “no person shall,” “import or commit to
import,” and “new long-term power purchase agreement.”125 The defendants to the action, the
MPUC and MDOC, argued the statutory language should be construed as narrowly as possible
since it was “unambiguous” in that it “merely regulate[d] the sources of power that Minnesota
utilities can rely upon to meet the needs of their customers.”126 Declining to adopt that
interpretation, the court determined the statute applied to “all persons,” in-state and out-of-state,
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Id. (other exceptions were made for new large energy facilities proposed prior to the NGEA, certain power
purchase contracts entered into prior to the NGEA, certain “essential” new large energy facilities or power purchase
agreements); Klass & Henley, supra note 5, at 170.
122
Id. at 897-98.
123
Id. at 898 (carbon dioxide reduction projects offset carbon dioxide emissions either by reducing an “existing
facilities contribution to [regulated emissions],” or by purchasing carbon dioxide allowances in a verified cap-andtrade program).
124
Id. at 902, 915-16 (plaintiffs argued that the statute had the “objective of reducing carbon dioxide emission
regardless of where they occur,” required “merchants to seek regulatory approval in Minnesota before undertaking
transactions in other states,” risked balkanization, and regulated transactions between out-of-state entities).
125
Id. at 908 (explaining that the scope of the statute was relevant to finding on the constitutional claim).
126
Id. (arguing that because a buyer in the regional grid cannot know the actual source of the electricity, it cannot
“import or commit to import” power from any source.” Thus, it would be “impossible to apply” the statute’s
provisions to any other entity than Minnesota utilities purchasing electricity for consumption in Minnesota. The
defendants point out that the regional market sales are for short-term, not long-term energy agreements and do not
“implicate the long-term power purchase agreement provisions”).
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to all transmissions through the regional (MISO) grid, and the long-term power agreements were
for capacity, and not energy that is “ultimately bid into the MISO market.”127
With that broad interpretation, the court then held that the Minnesota statute provisions
prohibiting electricity imports from new large energy facilities built outside the state, and
prohibiting regulated entities from entering into long-term power purchase agreements that
would contribute to statewide power sector carbon dioxide emissions, violated the
extraterritoriality principle, and were per se invalid.128 The court declined to limit the principle to
price control regulations.129
The court called the provisions a “classic example of extraterritorial regulation” in the
context of the interconnected electricity market.130 The court focused heavily on the “boundaryless nature” of the MISO grid in its opinion.131 The court analogized the transmission of
electricity through a grid interconnection to that of information flow over the internet.132
Specifically, like the internet, a region’s electricity grid is boundaryless. Meaning, nonMinnesota generators transmitting electricity on the MISO grid (even to satisfy the electricity
demand of non-Minnesota members) could not guarantee that electricity would not be “imported
to and contribute to” carbon dioxide emissions in Minnesota.133 Essentially, this forced out-ofstate entities seeking to do business within the MISO grid, but outside Minnesota, to “conduct
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Id. at 909-10. The Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO) is a Regional Transmission Organization
(RTO), designated by FERC, and responsible for coordinating, monitoring, and administering the transmission of
energy on a regional electricity grid. Id. at 895-96.
128
Id. at 910-11 (analyzing the “practical effect” of the provisions by looking at their consequences, interaction with
other states’ statutes, and the risk of the adoption of a similar statute by many or all other states).
129
Id. at 911 (citing, among others, Edgar v. MITE Corp., 475 U.S. at 642-43).
130
Id. at 916.
131
Id. at 917 (the grid encompasses multiple states and countries, and electricity transmission is indistinguishable).
132
Id. at 917. (analogizing the instant case to that of Am. Booksellers Found. V. Dean, 342 F.3d 96, 103-04 (2003),
which struck down internet-use regulations under dormant Commerce Clause grounds because the boundaryless
nature of the internet meant the Vermont statute projected its regulation into the jurisdiction of other states, thus
creating inconsistent legislation that the Commerce Clause is meant to prohibit).
133
Two non-Minnesota entities entering into long-term capacity agreements in the MISO market cannot ensure that
the electricity produced and transmitted through the grid will not be consumed in Minnesota. Id.
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their out-of-state business according to Minnesota’s terms.”134 The court goes on to posture that
such a regulatory regime, if adopted by other states, would bring the electricity market “to a
grinding halt.”135
C. Eighth Circuit Upholds with One of Three Judges Affirming Commerce Clause Grounds
The three-judge panel on appeal to the Eighth Circuit separately concluded that the
NGEA provisions were invalid. Judge Loken, who authored the opinion, agreed that the statute
impermissibly regulated extraterritorially.136 Explaining that the “presumption against
extraterritoriality does not apply when the statute’s text is clear,” the opinion goes on to reiterate
and affirm the district court’s holding, including declining to limit extraterritoriality to pricecontrol or price-affirmation laws.137 Judge Loken found the challenged provisions had the effect
of regulating non-Minnesota importers and generators of electricity in transactions “wholly”
outside of Minnesota because those entities “injecting electricity into the MISO grid” cannot be
certain that electricity will not be consumed in Minnesota; thus, forcing out-of-state entities
conducting entirely out-of-state business, to either “unplug” from the MISO market or seek
regulatory approval in Minnesota prior to engaging in interstate commerce.138
However, Judge Murphy disagreed with Judge Loken’s application of the
extraterritoriality principle.139 She pointed out the electricity grid “behaves as an undifferentiated
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Id. at 901 (one of the out-of-state plaintiffs, Basin Electric Power Cooperative, sought approval from the MPUC
to provide coal-fired electricity to its North Dakota customers because it didn’t know if the NGEA would prohibit
the move. Basin Electric was also stalling on entering into long-term power purchase agreements in other MISO
market states out of concern for violating Minnesota’s statute).
135
Id. at 918 (stating that the statute-provided exemption for a “carbon dioxide reduction project” approved by the
MPUC had the effect of requiring out-of-state entities to get approval from Minnesota before “inject[ing] coalgenerated electricity into the MISO grid to serve its [out-of-state] members.” This exemption, combined with the
provisions requiring in-state utilities to purchase a certain amount of electricity from certain sources, if adopted by
many other states, would create a patchwork of regulations applicable to the same regional electricity market).
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Heydinger, 825 F.3d at 919.
137
Id. at 921.
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Id.
139
Id. at 923 (J. Murphy, dissenting).
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electromagnetic wave.”140 Specifically, electrons do not “flow” from one connection on the grid
to another. Generators effectively energize the grid, and consumers simply draw indiscriminate
power from the grid.141 Thus, the statute could not possibly mean to regulate the flow of
electrons from certain generators to Minnesota consumers, rendering Judge Loken’s
interpretation implausible.142 In her opinion, and with that understanding of the grid in mind, the
NGEA applied only when non-Minnesota entities were transacting to import electricity into
Minnesota, or enter in long-term power purchase agreements to import electricity into
Minnesota—actions which would not implicate extraterritorial regulation.143 She would have
invalidated the provisions as preempted by the FPA because it regulated wholesale electricity, an
area solely regulated by the FERC.144
Judge Colloton, on the other hand, would have invalidated the NGEA as preempted under
the Clean Air Act provision that calls for states to regulate in-state stationary sources.145 In his
analysis, the offset provisions “encroach[ed] on the source State’s authority to govern emission
from sources within its borders.”146 Judge Colloton also did not reach the constitutional question.
Thus, only one of the three Eighth Circuit panel members invalidated the provisions on the
grounds of impermissible extraterritorial regulation.
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Id. at 924.
Id. at 924-25.
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Id. at 924 (discussing that “in interpreting a Minnesota statute we presume that the legislature did not intend a
result that is absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable”) (internal quotations omitted).
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Id. at 923. (stating that the NGEA regulates out-of-state entities only when doing business with Minnesota, which
does not equate to regulating wholly out-of-state transactions). This might fall better in line with the Tenth Circuit.
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Id. at 926 (explaining that the import provision essentially bans wholesale sales in interstate commerce).
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He also agreed with Judge Murphy’s opinion that the statute was preempted by the FPA because the statute
banned wholesale sales of electricity, an area of exclusive FERC authority. Id. at 928 (J. Colloton, dissenting).
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Id. at 929.
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V. Confusion on the Circuits on Extraterritorial Reach
This section is meant to summarize key distinctions from the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth
Circuit decisions that highlight the differences in fact patterns and doctrinal interpretation across
the jurisdictions.147
A. Fact Patterns Distinguishable by Scope but Also Show Similar Purpose
The state laws at issue in California, Colorado, and Minnesota, regulated different energy
sectors utilizing different mechanisms. But what these distinct laws have in common may be
more important than what separates them. For instance, the LCFS and RES were determined to
apply only to fuel blenders selling ethanol in California, and Colorado utilities providing
electricity to Colorado consumers, respectively—i.e., in-state activities.148 In contrast, the Eighth
Circuit held that Minnesota’s NGEA language encompassed out-of-state entities and
transactions. But, what each of the three share is the fact that they effectively impact some outof-state conduct for the purpose of promoting renewable energy and GHG reductions.
The goal of California’s LCFS was transportation fuel emissions reductions that result
from the growing, production, and transportation of ethanol blended and sold in California. The
Plaintiffs argued that the undifferentiated chemical and physical properties of ethanol prohibited
California from assigning more favorable carbon intensity values to different pathways—i.e., the
different values could only be based on location, an illegitimate regulatory mechanism.149 The
Ninth Circuit disagreed, holding California appropriately grounded its rationale in the “harmful
properties of fuel.”150 In the context of California’s ethanol market, the local harm felt was the

For the sake of comparison, Judge Loken’s extraterritoriality doctrine analysis is used here.
Rocky Mt. Farmers Union, 730 F.3d at 1103; Energy & Env’t Legal Inst., 43 F. Supp. 3d at 1179.
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Rocky Mountain II, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1088.
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effects associated with GHGs.151 The harmful properties of ethanol are not solely in its burning
(consumption) in the State. Meaning, regardless of the identical chemical and physical properties
of the ethanol consumed in California, the harmful properties of ethanol include those GHGs
associated with its production and transportation.152 Thus, California accurately took into
account the “real extent” of emissions associated with its ethanol market.153
Colorado’s more “traditional” RES statute required certain utilities to provide Colorado
consumers with a certain percentage of electricity from renewable sources. The basis of the
Plaintiff’s challenge was the physical structure of the regional grid, shared by Colorado and other
jurisdictions, which allows the free flow of energy anywhere on that grid, meaning that
Colorado’s RES would have the effect of decreasing demand for coal-fired power generation,
causing out-of-state coal producers to lose business with out-of-state coal-powered generators
connected to the grid.154 The Tenth Circuit held that regardless of the fact that coal producers
may see a decrease in demand for their product, the Renewables Quota did not regulate the grid,
and its impact on the grid—and thus out-of-state producers and consumers—was “far from
obviously negative,” if existing at all.155 Additionally, the court focused on the distinction
between quality-of-goods standards and price-control standards, firmly placing Colorado’s RES
in the former category.
Minnesota’s NGEA was similar to Colorado’s RES in the respect that it attempted to
promote renewable energy sources of electricity, but instead of requiring utilities to purchase a
certain percentage of electricity from renewables, it prohibited the importation of electricity from
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new coal-powered generators. Again, the basis of the challenge was due in part to the
interconnectedness of the grid. Except that in this case, in addition to the judicial construct of the
language “no person shall” to apply to non-Minnesota entities, the physical structure of the
regional grid contributed to the demise of the importation prohibition and long-term power
purchase agreement provisions. Specifically, Judge Loken determined that because of the
unregulated flow of electricity in a regional power grid, out-of-state generators could not be
certain the electricity they fed to the grid to meet the demand of out-of-state customers would not
be consumed in Minnesota, forcing them to seek regulatory approval in Minnesota prior to
conducting business wholly outside the state.156
B. Comparing Extraterritoriality Application on the Circuits
The Ninth and Tenth Circuits expressed concern with trampling on the federalism
principles that encourage states to experiment in developing innovative regulatory regimes,
especially those that seek to protect the health and safety of the public and environment.157
The Ninth and Eighth Circuits applied the extraterritoriality principle to non-price control
or price-affirmation statutes.158 In contrast, the Tenth Circuit held that the extraterritoriality
principle was limited solely to price control or affirmation statutes.159
The Ninth Circuit and Tenth Circuits both accepted incidental effects on commerce from
state regulations that attempted to influence outside behavior.160 Specifically, the Ninth Circuit
found no fault with policies regulating in-state commerce with a “goal of influencing the out-of-
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state choices of market participants.”161 Likewise, the Tenth Circuit held that in-state quality
control mandates, while likely creating “ripple effects,” in-state and out-of-state, do not require
almost per se invalidation under extraterritoriality.162 The Eighth Circuit, on the other hand, held
that the NGEA sought to reduce emissions occurring entirely outside of Minnesota by preventing
MISO market participants from adding new coal-fired generators to the grid (despite the fact that
the NGEA applied only to imports of electricity for consumption in Minnesota).163 This suggests
that Judge Loken would not agree with the Ninth and Tenth Circuits that state laws that influence
out-of-state conduct are permitted to some degree. In other words, if it is impermissible for
regulations to have the effect of reducing emissions occurring entirely outside the state, will
states subject to the Eighth Circuit’s jurisdiction be permitted to account for out-of-state GHG
generators that contribute to in-state emissions?164
Lastly, neither the Ninth or Tenth Circuit truly analyzed extraterritoriality as its own
brand of jurisprudence. For example, the Ninth Circuit’s holding that lifecycle factors were nondiscriminatory set the foundation to then find that it did not regulate extraterritorially.165 The
Tenth Circuit questioned whether extraterritoriality was a “distinct line of dormant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence at all,” or just an extension of the discrimination analysis.166
VI. CONCLUSION
The essential question is whether the different rulings, upholding California’s LCFS and
Colorado’s RES, while invalidating Minnesota’s NGEA, were due to a difference in fact, or in
the courts’ interpretation of extraterritoriality. This could have important implications for state
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policies moving forward. Due to the structure of the U.S. grid, and the physical and chemical
properties of GHGs, the “practical effect” of state climate change prevention policies will likely
be to account for emissions—and therefore some conduct—of out-of-state entities.
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